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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH MARKS, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY 
co., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
9785 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Continental Casualty Company, 
appeals from a decision of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Stewart H. Hanson, Judge, grant-
ing to respondent a judgment in the sum of $1,783.70 
on a claim that she was covered by hospitalization 
and surgical insurance policies issued by the ap-
pellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The respondent filed suit against appellant on 
November 13, 1964 contending that she was entitled 
to compensation under two policies issued by appel-
1 
Ian t covering medical expenses she incurred for a 
lumbar disc fusion of her back. The appellant de-
nied coverage on the grounds of misrepresentation 
in the insurance application on each policy and on 
the grounds the operations arose as the result of a 
pre-insuring condition. Trial was held without jury 
on March 30, 1966 before the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, Judge. Judgment was rendered for 
respondent. A motion for a new trial was made and 
denied and appellant prosecuted this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant contends that the decision of the 
trial court should be reversed and judgment entered 
dismissing the respondent's action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant submits the following statement 
of facts. 
Respondent in her complaint alleged that the 
appellant had issued to her two insurance policies 
(nos. 31381609, 31381610) entitling her to insur-
ance benefits as a result of back surgery she had on 
April 5, 1964. (R. 1) Appellant admitted the issu-
ance of the policies and the surgery that respondent, 
Mrs. Ruth Marks, had had performed but denied 
the coverage of the policies and alleged misrepre-
sentation on her part and a pre-existing condition. 
(R. 2, 3-4) 
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Mrs. Marks testified that she resided in Salt 
Lake City and that the policies in question had been 
paid for by her former husband. ( R. 25) Exhibits 
P-1 and P-2 are two insurance policies issued by the 
appellant to the respondent. P-1 covered medical 
and surgical expense and P-2 hospitalization. Both 
policies were issued effective May 27, 1963. 
Mrs. Marks testified on direct examination 
that the information on the application accompany-
ing exhibit P-1 indicating she nor her dependents 
had ever been treated for "arthritis, rheumatism, 
back, spine, bone, joint or muscle disorder" was a 
correct answer. The same answer was made with 
reference to a similar application accompanying 
exhibit P-2. It was admitted that the policies were 
in effect on April 4, 1964 at the time respondent 
underwent surgery for her back. Mrs. Marks did 
sustain medical expense as a result of the surgery 
in the sum $1,614.21. (R. 28, Exh. P-4) 
The respondent had also refunded the premium 
checks given for the policies and rejected Mrs. 
Mar ks claim. ( R. 28) 
Mrs. Marks testified that she did not fill out 
the application for the policies, that this was ap-
parently done by her brother-in-law, Mr. Borofsky. 
(R. 29) She stated Borofsky was an agent working 
for the Harry Magoon Agency, in Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
( R. 30) The policies were placed with the Magoon 
Agency. She testified that she signed only one ap-
3 
plication and it was signed in blank. (R. 29) At 
the time of trial the applications accompanying ex-
hibits P-1 and P-2 were received in evidence and 
they were filled out and a signature purporting to 
be that of Mrs. Marks was on each application. Re-
spondent denied the signature on one application 
was hers (Exh. P-1, R. 33) and assumed it was 
Borofsky who signed her name. She claimed she 
did not authorize him to sign her name. (R. 45, 46) 
She did admit signing the application P-2 which 
she said was sent to her, and was the only applica-
tion she received. ( R. 33) She also denied receiving 
a letter from the Magoon Agency asking her to fill 
out the two applications and a doctor's authoriza-
tion statement. (R. 34) Exhibit D-6 was received 
and was a letter addressed to Mrs. Marks from 
Harry B. Magoon purporting to forward two ap-
plications and doctor's statement. The letter ad-
monished respondent to give careful attention to the 
questions in the applications, and return the docu-
ments. The letter expressly stated: 
If there has been any medical history on your 
children, please specify the doctors name on 
the 'Physicians Form.' (Exhibit D-6) 
Mrs. Marks testified that on receipt of the policies 
she did not examine the applications which were 
attached to the policies. (R. 34, 35) 
Mrs. Marks, on cross-examination, admitted 
that, prior to the applications and the effective date 
of the policies, in 1958, she had been in an auto-
4 
mobile accident which "severed nerves" in her arm 
and she had no control of her wrist. (R. 36) Sec-
tions 10 B of both policies had negative indications 
as to paralysis and 10 F was also negative as to 
joint and bone disorders. (Exh. P-1, 2) She went 
into the hospital in 1958 for treatment of the in-
jury. (R. 37) Exhibit D-7 was admitted which was 
a surgical report made to the Utah State Industrial 
Commission. In section 2 of the report on the nature 
and extent of the injuries the following was noted: 
Crushing injury to left arm, mid portion 
with puncture wound, hematoma formation 
and partial nerve paralysis of median, ulnar 
and radial nerves. 
Mrs. Marks also admitted on cross-examination 
that in 1954 she underwent a coccygectomy and her 
coccyx was removed. ( R. 30) She testified she wrote 
a letter to Borofsky in which she disclosed the coccy-
gectomy in 1954. (R. 30) She did not have a copy 
of the letter and none was produced at trial. She 
also admitted sustaining a "severe fall" in 1955 for 
which she was treated for radiating pain down both 
legs. ( R. 38) She testified she was treated by Drs. 
Lamb and Chapman. She remembered seeing Dr. 
Lamb and telling him she had pain in the lower 
back and both legs. ( R. 40). 
Respondent on her admission to the hospital 
in April, 1964, gave her medical history to an in-
tern. (R. 40) She told the intern she had intermit-
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tent low back pain for the past nine years. (R. 
40-41 Exh. 1 medical records) She had been treated 
in 1955 by Dr. Lamb and Dr. Chapman. 
On redirect examination Mrs. Marks testified 
she had no back disorder when she applied for the 
policy and hadn't had any subsequent to her hos-
pitalization in 1957 as a result of the automobile 
accident. She testified that she could not recall if 
she had low back pain when she saw Dr. Chapman 
in July, 1955, but felt the only pain she had was in 
the area of where the coccyx had been. 
The depositions of Mr. Harry B. Magoon and 
Dr. Robert Lamb were published and received. (1) 
Mr. Magoon testified that he was an independent 
general insurance agent doing business as Magoon 
Associates Inc. and represented several companies. 
(M 3) His offices were in Tulsa, Oklahoma. One 
of the companies he represents is the defendant. (M 
4) He indicated applications were sent to Mrs. 
Marks on a suggestion from Jerry Borofsky, Mrs. 
Marks' brother-in-law. (M 4,5) The arrangements 
for payment premiums and initial suggestions for 
insurance were apparently made by Mrs. Marks' 
former husband. Mr. Magoon never talked to him. 
He in di ca ted he sent a letter to Mrs. Marks ( Exh. 
D-6) along with the applications and an attending 
doctor's statement. ( M 6) He believed Mrs. Marks 
( 1) The record of the Magoon deposition will be refened to 
as (1\1-). The Lamb record of the deposition will be refened to 
as (L-). 
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returned the applications. He said a signature on 
the applications was absolutely necessary to issu-
ance of the policy as was completion of the applica-
tions. He indicated that if there had been any in-
dication of a medical problem he would not have 
processed the applications with the doctor's state-
ment. (M 10) He was under an assumption Mrs. 
Marks had signed both applications, he had not seen 
the application after return when it was not com-
pleted. The signature on both policy applications 
is almot identical, and it is doubtful if anyone but 
an expert could tell the difference if in fact the 
signature was not Mrs. Marks. No other correspon-
dence was received from Mrs. Marks. (M 16). 
All checkmarks in the application column were 
marked '·'no." Mr. Magoon said if back trouble had 
been marked it would have been a "red flag." (M 
19) He stated a back disorder would have to have 
been checked out before the policies would have been 
sent to the company. (M 20) The home office issued 
all policies. ( M 20) Mr. Magoon knew of no cor-
respondence betwen Borof sky and Mrs. Marks. Bor-
of sky was not a licensed agent at the time, but had 
applied. No special consideration was given to rela-
tives ( M 35), and he knew Borofsky and Mrs. 
Marks were related. (M 33) Mr. Magoon was of 
the opinion that Borofsky was not to be trusted. 
(M 39) 
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Applications are examined by the company's 
underwriting department before being issued. (M 
38) The issuance of the policy under these circum-
stances would have violated company rules. (M 41) 
Dr. Robert Lamb testified that he was an ortho-
pedic surgeon and first saw Mrs. Marks on July 
26, 1955. Dr. Chapman saw her July 21, 1955. 
( L 2,3) The medical records on Mrs. Marks showed 
she was treated for low back pain radiating into 
both legs. He diagnosed her condition as evidencing 
definite nerve root pressure. (L 5) He did not see 
Mrs. Marks until 1964 when he did a myelograrn 
and determined to operate. (L 7) The operation dis-
closed a protruding disc, and a pathological exam-
ination disclosed a degenerated fibrocartilage. (L 
7) Dr. Lamb was of the opinion, based on the medi-
cal history, that there was a probable connection 
between the 1955 fall and treatment and the 1964 
operation, especially in view of the intermittent 
back pain. ( L 7, 8) He also was of the opinion the 
fall in 1955 probably had a causative relationship. 
(L 11, 12) 
Mrs. Marks had indicated the operation was 
a consumation of the fall nine years prior. She stat-
ed in response to the following question: 
Question: You subsequently went to the hos-
pital for an operation to correct a defect 
in the lumbar spinal column or the lower 
part of your back? 
Answer: Nine years later, I guess. 
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Based on the above evidence the court found for 
Mrs. Marks, and found no intention on the part of 
the plaintiff to deceive or defraud, that there was 
no connection between the 1955 fall and treatment 
and the 1964 operation. The court further found 
the 1955 treatment and injury and the 1954 opera-
tion were not incidents that increased the hazard 
"for which defndant issued its policies." (R 10) 
Judgment was rendered for respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF DEFRAUDED THE DEFENDANT 
IN OBTAINING INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
The appellant submits the trial court commit-
ted error in failing to determine that plaintiff ob-
tained insurance coverage by material misrepre-
sentation. In urging its position on appeal appel-
lant is aware of the necessity of viewing the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
decision. Even so, appellant submits the evidence 
overwhelmingly demonstrates that respondent should 
have been denied recovery. 
In Castagna v. Occidental Life Insurance Co., 
151 F. Supp. 781 (D.C. Utah 1957) Judge Chris-
tensen, applying Utah law in a similar case ob-
served: 
Verdicts may not be permitted to rest u~on 
mere conjecture and where proven facts give 
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equal support to each of two inconsistent in-
ferences, judgment as a matter of law must 
go against the party having the burden of 
proof (citing case). There is a presumption 
of intent to deceive from the knowing con-
cealment of material facts unless such pre-
sumption is overthrown by substantial evi- ' 
dence. Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 
of United States, 10 Cir., 1938, 97 F.2d 583, 
see also Id., 10 Cir., 108 F.2d 902. The bur-
den is upon the plaintiff to prove lack of an 
intent to deceive on the part of the insured. 
31-19-8, U.C.A., 1953 relating to representa-
tions in applications for insurance now reads: 
( 1) All statements and descriptions in any 
application for an insurance policy or annu-
ity contract, or for the reinstatement or re-
newal thereof, by or in behalf of the insured 
or annuitant, shall be deemed to be representa-
tions and not warranties. Misrepresentations, 
omissions, concealment of facts, and incor-
rect statements shall not prevent a recovery 
under the policy or contract unless: 
(a) fraudulent; or 
(b) material either to the acceptance 
of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by 
the insurer ; or 
( c) the insurer in good faith either 
would not have issued the policy or con-
tract, or would not have issued, rein-
stated or renewed it at the same pre-
mium rate, or would not have issued, re-
instated, or renewed a policy or contract 
in as large an amount, or would not have 
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provided coverage with respect to the 
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true 
facts had been made known to the insurer 
as required either by the application for 
the policy or contract or otherwise. 
( 2) If, in any action to rescind any policy 
or con tract or to recover thereon, any mis-
representation with respect to a medical im-
pairment is proved by the insurer, and the 
insured or any other person having or claim-
ing a right under the contract shall prevent 
full disclosure and proof of the nature of 
the medical impairment, the misrepresenta-
tion shall be presumed to have been material. 
Thus any material misrepresentation relating 
should be presumed to have been material. The re-
quirement of fraud is similar to the same require-
ment existing under prior laws, Laws of Utah 1947, 
Ch. 63, Sec. 2; Chadwick v. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 54 
Utah 443, 181 Pac. 448. The present statute be-
came effective July 1, 1963. Thus, the above section 
became effective subsequent to the issuance of the 
policies in question. The statute in effect before 
(Laws of Utah 1947, Ch. 63, Sec. 2) read: 
( 1) Except as provided in subsection 
( 2) , no oral or written misrepresen ta ti on or 
warranty made in the negotiation of an in-
surance contract, by the insured or in his be-
half shall be deemed material or defeat or 
avoid the contract or prevent it attaching, 
unless such misrepresentation or warranty is 
made with the intent to deceive. 
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The insured shall have the burden of 
proof that such misrepresentation or war-
ranty was not made with intent to deceive. 
(2) In any application for life or dis-
ability insurance made in writing by the in-
sured, all statements therein made by the in-
sured shall, in the absence of fraud, be deem-
ed representations and not warranties. The 
falsity of any such statement shall not bar 
the right to recovery under the contract un-
less it materially affected either the accept-
ance of the risk or the hazard assumed by 
the insurer. 
Appellant submits from a substantive point 
of view it is relatively immaterial which statute 
applies, but submits respondent still has the burden 
to prove lack of an intent to deceive. 
The facts in this case show two applications 
for insurance. Both bear the purported signatures 
of Mrs. Marks. Although she testified she only 
signed one of the applications, the signatures rather 
appear to be of the same hand. Both applications 
indicated that the respondent had never suffered 
or sustained any back injury, or had any back 
trouble. The evidence clearly showed Mrs. Marks 
had a coccygectomy in 1954, sustained a severe fall 
in 1955, and had intermittent back pain subse-
quently. The failure to disclose this matter in the , 
applications was obviously an intentional misrepre-
sentation amounting to fraud. Although Mrs. Marks 
testified that she signed the application in blank, 
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the more probable truth is that there was a scheme 
between herself and her brother-in-law, Borofsky, 
not to disclose the prior problem. Mrs. Marks said 
she sent a letter to Borofsky, which was not pro-
duced at trial, in which she disclosed the prior op-
eration. However, she did not testify that the letter 
disclosed the fall and treatment, nor the intermit-
tent pain, nor finally the paralysis to her wrist as 
a result of the automobile accident in 1957. The 
latter failure to disclose also indicates an intent to 
deceive because of the negative markings in the 
appropriate area on the policy applications. 
The affirmative evidence on the part of appel-
lant showed a letter was sent to Mrs. Marks ex-
pressly directing her to fill out the applications, 
note medical histories, and return the applications 
with the doctor's statement. It is submitted the evi-
dence before the trial court did not overcome the 
presumption of the intent to deceive nor sustain 
her burden of proof. 
In Castagno v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra, 
the court overturned a jury verdict for plaintiff. 
The case shows facts indistinguishable in principle 
from those of the instant case. The deceased had 
failed to properly disclose material health problems 
in an insurance application. There had been some 
disclosure to the selling agent but not to the physi-
cian (cit. p. 783). The court held this was insuffi-
cient to sustain the burden and granted a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
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In Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 
1 Sec. 248 it is stated: 
The failure of the insured to fill in any 
blank demanding information as to medical 
attendance amounts to a positive statement 
that none have been rendered, and conceal-
ment of any treatments of consequence is 
held fraudulent. 
And further, Sec. 254 
It has frequently happened that the ap-
plicant mentions certain treatments which 
have been rendered him but fails to include 
certain others, or that he gives the name of 
certain attending physicians but fails to give 
the names of others. 
In such event where the insured denies 
having received medical attention from other 
than certain named physicians, such a repre-
sentation is usually deemed material to the 
:isk, so as to avoid liability on the part of the 
msurer. 
Appelman would seem to clearly support a con-
clusion that even if Mrs. Marks disclosed her opera-
tion the failure to disclose other medical problems 
would preclude recovery. 
Further, Mrs. Marks can gain nothing by her 
claim that she signed one application in blank. In 
so doing she was aware of her aiding a non-dis-
closure and obviously intended the application to 
be filled in in any manner Borofsky felt proper. In 
14 
Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d 
205, 407 P.2d 685 ( 1965) this court observed: 
Upon the record, and plaintiff does not 
contend otherwise, it appears that the an-
swers contained in the application were un-
true; they were material to the risk; the de-
fendant believed and relied upon them; and 
the defendant, being deceived by them, would 
not have issued the policy had it known the 
truth - at least, not without a medical ex-
amination. 
The appellant's contention was that the proper 
answers had been given by the insured but not prop-
arly recorded by the agent. The applicant had sign-
ed the policy. The court went on to observe: 
In order to defeat recovery on an insur-
ance policy because of misrepresentation in 
the application, the misrepresentations must 
have been made with an intent to deceive 
and defraud the insurance company. How-
ever, such an intent may be inferred where 
the applicant knowingly misrepresents facts 
which he knows would influence the insurer 
in accepting or rejecting the risk. The same 
rule should apply where the applicant know-
ingly, or with constructive knowledge, per-
mits such misrepresentations to be submitted 
to the insurance company. 
* * * 
It is also the majority rule that an in-
sured is under a duty to read his application 
before signing it, and will be considered bound 
by a knowledge of the contents of his signed 
application. This is merely an application of 
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fundamental contract law. While courts gen-
erally are inclined to treat insurance contracts 
as special and do not always vigorously apply 
all the principles of contract law, that tend-
ency should not be allowed to overrun the 
bounds of legitimate exception. 
The facts here presented provide abso-
lutely no basis for applying any exception to 
the basic contract law. The record is devoid 
of any facts or circumstances that would in-
dicate or imply that Theros was by fraud, 
accident, misrepresentation, imposition, illi-
teracy, artifice or device reasonably prevent-
ed from reading the application before sign-
ing it. Therefore, he is, by law, conclusively 
presumed to have read the application and 
his beneficiary is bound by the contents there-
of. It therefore follows that the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
Apart from the trial court's memorandum de-
cision rejecting the application of the above case, 
the logic of the case seems controlling and decisive 
of this appeal. 
The case of Wootton v. Combined Ins. Co. of 
America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 ( 1964) found 
controlling by the trial court is not precedent to 
sustain the trial court's award. In that case the 
answers on the application were not directly false 
as they are in the instant case. A direct disclosure 
of the full condition of deceased was made, not so 
in this case. The only issue in Wootton was intent, 
and the court observed: 
The failure of respondent to volunteer 
the information that her husband had re-
16 
signed his job in July because with the added 
work his weak leg was being adversely af-
fected cannot reasonably be considered as suf-
ficient evidence upon which to base a find-
ing of intent to defraud. Appellant had suffi-
cient knowledge of the physical disability of 
respondent's husband to ascertain all the facts 
it needed as to its extent, if it had deemed it 
important, by either asking further questions 
or conducting an investigation; and it cannot 
blind itself from ascertaining the truth and 
then claim wilful misrepresentation of the 
truth on which it relied in order to avoid pay-
ment under a policy. This would appear to be 
especially applicable in the instant case where 
the accidental death of respondent's husband 
was not in any way related to his physical 
defect. 
A reading of the case discloses its inapplic-
ability to the instant appeal. The Wootton case is 
similar to New York Life Ins. v. Grow, 103 Utah, 
285, 135 P.2d 130 ( 1943) where this court sustained 
a jury's verdict for the insured, finding the an-
swers in the application ambiguous and, therefore, 
capable of being found not to have been made with 
an intent to deceive. In this case the answers were 
unambiguous and false. 
In Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assitr., 97 F.2d 
583 (10th Cir. 1938), the court had a life insurance 
claim, which required the application of Utah law. 
The court said: 
A misrepresentation will not constitute 
a defense to an action on a policy of insur-
17 
ance unless it was intentionally untrue or 
made with a reckless disregard for its truth 
or falsity. Where an insured knowingly makes 
a material misrepresentation, proof of an ac-
tual, conscious purpose to deceive is not ne-
cessary. 
This language was approved by the Utah Su-
preme Court in the Grow case. In the subsequent 
Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Asur. case, 108 F.2d 
902 (10th Cir. 1940), the 10th Cir. approved the 
following language from the second Chadwick case, 
56 Utah 480, 191 Pac. 240: 
If the insured at the time of making his 
application for a policy has knowledge or 
good reason to know that he is afflicted with 
a disease that renders his condition serious, 
and that thereby his longevity will be preju-
dicially impaired, his statements and repre-
sentations to the contrary in reply to specific 
inquiries constitute a fraud practiced upon 
the insurer, and which, when successfully 
proven, invalidates the policy. 
The second Zolintakis case then concludes: 
By this decision Utah is committed to 
the liberal doctrine that before misrepresent-
ations of material facts will void a policy of 
insurance it must be established that they 
were not only knowingly made but also wil-
fully and intentionally, with intent to deceive 
and defraud. 
* * * 
The court then goes on to explain : 
One cannot knowingly conceal or mis-
represent facts which one knows would in-
18 
fluence the risk or the issuance of the policy, 
and then be heard to say that he did not in-
tend to deceive or defraud. 
The above cases support judgment for the ap-
pellant since respondent lent herself to at least a 
constructive misrepresentation and did so inten-
tionally. 
The trial court's finding that if there was any 
failure to disclose it did not increase the hazard is 
equally erroneous. First, the only testimony on the 
issue, except an objectionable opinion from Mrs. 
Mars, was Mr. Magoon's testimony that back prob-
lems are "red flag." Second, the finding is imma-
terial since that issue was of no consequence under 
the law in existence at the time the policies were 
issued. Finally, 31-19-8, U.C.A., 1953 presumes a 
failure to disclose medical information in policies 
like those in question is material. Consequently, the 
court's findings do not sustain the judgment. This 
court should reverse. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT MRS. MARKS' MEDICAL PROBLEM COMMENC-
ED PRIOR TO THIRTY DAYS FROM THE EFFEC-
TIVE DATE OF THE POLICY. 
The two policies issued by the appellant to 
Mrs. Marks both contained provisions to the effect 
that no sickness or injury was covered which com-
menced prior to thirty days after the policy had 
19 
been in force ( Exh. P-1, P-2). Consequently, if Mrs. 
Marks was operated on for a condition that had its 
inception prior to the 30 day period subsequent to 
the effective date of the policy, the defendant should 
have prevailed. 
Appellant realizes that in appraising the evi-
dence on appeal it must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. Appellant submits, 
however, that even when the evidence is so exam-
ined there is no reasonable basis for the judgment 
in favor of the respondent. 
The effective date of the policies was May 27, 
1963. It was undisputed that respondent underwent 
a coccygectomy in 1954. It was equally undisputed 
that Mrs. Marks sustained a "severe fall" in 1955 
and sought orthopedic assistance. Medical records 
of the treating physicians showed low back pain 
radiating into both legs. Sensitivity was noticed in 
the lumbosacral region and the sacrum. Diagnosis 
on the last visit in 1955 was of for "consideration 
of excision of protruded intervertebral disc and a 
fusion." Mrs. Marks never went back for further 
treatment. On admittance to the hospital for the 
operation giving rise to the instant case, she advised 
the intern who took her history that nine years 
prior she had a severe fall landing on her but-
tocks. The intern noted, "Since that time she has in-
termittent low back pain, sometimes so severe she 
cannot get out of bed." The correctness of the in-
20 
formation given the intern was verified at trial 
except she denied she hadn't been able to get out of 
bed for 4¥2 months before the operation. ( R. 42). 
On redirect examination by her attorney she 
said she had no pain in her back after 1957. She 
also testified that the location of the pain was in 
the area of where the coccyx had been ( R. 55). 
Dr. Lamb gave his opinion as follows: 
If I might stipulate a little further, that 
in view of the fact that she stated that she 
had had continued symptoms since that time, 
there would possibly, probably be a connec-
tion between that and her present condition 
insofar as her symptoms had been recurrent 
intermittently since then. 
Dr. Lamb also testified that the operation showed 
a degenerated fibrocartilage condition (L 8). 
It is submitted on the basis of this evidence 
the standard of probability set out in Moore v. D. 
& R. G. W. R. R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 
( 1956), the only believable evidence and the only 
expert, scientific evidence offered showed the oper-
ation was performed as a result of a pre-existing 
condition. The history given to the intern is much 
more objective evidence of Mrs. Marks' true con-
dition than her testimony at trial. It is interesting 
to note how clearly that evidence coincides with the 
traditional degenerative disc condition. In Haynes, 
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The Diagnosis of Disc Injuries, 1 Lawyers Medical 
Journal 1, 5 ( 1965) it is observed: 
The history given by the patient with 
a suspected protruded intervertebral lumbar 
disc is one of the more important factors in 
determining the accuracy of a diagnosis of 
disc injury. 
Usually, there has been a rather mild 
or minimal injury. This injury need not be 
confined to the spine itself. It can be no more 
violent than stepping off a curb, a mistimed 
golf swing, the picking up of a light or heavy 
object, or a fit of coughing. There is, however, 
usually a fairly long history prior to the pa-
tient seeing the neurosurgeon of, at least, in-
termittent low back ache with many episodes 
of low back pain with or without radiation 
of pain down either leg. Usually the prelim-
inary history of low back pain is not diagnos-
tic of anything beyond the fact that there are 
occasional bouts of muscle spasm and usually 
without radiation. 
It is of course recognized that there is norm-
ally no absolute obligation on the part of the court 
or jury to accept as conclusive the testimony of an 
expert. However, in the instant case the expert tes-
timony is direct and corroborated by other objective 
evidence, some coming from the respondent herself. 
Additionally, the respondent's testimony first sup-
port appellant's position then on redirect examina-
tion it was changed. Her testimony was inconsistent, 
thus undermining its relative value. This in the face 
of strong counter evidence of experts, independent-
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ly corroborated, discloses the trial court erred in 
reaching the conclusion it did. Finally, respondent's 
unguarded statement at a point when the trial had 
not directly focused on the issue, that the operation 
was the result of an accident nine years before re-
quires finding that the "back" condition for which 
respondent underwent surgery in April of 1964, 
predated the effective period of policy coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of the instant case show that re-
spondent was not entitled to judgment. The policies 
under which Mrs. Marks sought to sustain her 
right to recover against appellant were obtained 
under fraudulent circumstances, and respondent did 
not sustain her burden to the contrary. Finally, the 
evidence relating to a pre-existing condition over-
whelmingly supports the conclusion that Mrs. 
Marks' condition existed prior to the inception of 
the policies and, therefore, was excluded from their 
coverage. The judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
REX J. HANSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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